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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically analyzes the call timing of callable bonds to see how refunding 
opportunity, cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, and private information affect 
the call decision.  The empirical results show that firms issue callable bonds, convertible or 
not, to enjoy future refunding options; that the cost of financial distress weakly expedites 
calling convertible bonds but not non-convertibles; that firms which are in debt delay 
calling non-convertibles but not convertibles; that callable bonds, convertible or not, are 
issued to mitigate adverse selection under information asymmetry; and that after the end of 
call protection periods the call intensity monotonically decreases for the non-convertible 
bonds but not for the convertible bonds. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the motivations for designing and calling callable non-
convertible bonds and callable convertible bonds.  It investigates whether callable debt has 
a relative advantage over non-callable bonds or straight equity; how a firm determines to 
exercise an embedded call option; and how calling is different between callable non-
convertible bonds and callable convertible bonds. 
Having issued a callable bond, a firm makes a decision to call the bond based on 
its own characteristics and the outside environment.  The factors predicted to affect calling 
are classified into two categories.  One is a set of firm characteristics including the cost of 
financial distress, the agency cost of debt, the information released after issuance, and the 
transaction cost of refunding.  The other category includes the movements of the market 
interest rate and the stock value.  We estimate the hazard rate of calling a bond at each point 
in time as a function of the set of predicted factors observed by that time. 
In this paper, we analyze both callable non-convertible bonds and callable 
convertible bonds.  A call option provides the issuing firm with an optional right to redeem 
the bond at a pre-determined call price before maturity.  In the case of a callable non-
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convertible bond, once the firm exercises the call option, the bondholder has no other 
choice but to exchange the bond for cash.   
A conversion option provides the bondholder with an optional right to convert the 
bond into equity according to a pre-determined conversion ratio.  In the case of a callable 
convertible bond, once the firm exercises the call option, the bondholder chooses either to 
convert it into equity or to exchange it for cash.  The choice depends on the relative 
magnitude of the call price and the conversion value.  The conversion value is the value of 
the shares a bondholder receives upon conversion of a unit of bond.  If the call price were 
higher than the conversion value, the bondholder would not exercise the conversion option 
and receive cash (non-conversion forcing call).  If the conversion value were higher than 
the call price, the bondholder would choose to exercise the conversion option and receive 
shares (conversion forcing call). 
A callable bond might be issued primarily to utilize favorable refunding 
opportunities in the future.  Firms face an incentive to issue a callable non-convertible bond 
when they expect the market interest rate to fall after issuance, and an incentive to issue a 
callable convertible bond when they expect stock prices to go up.  By calling outstanding 
bonds, firms refund at a lower interest rate (callable non-convertible bonds and non-
conversion forcing calls), or force bond-equity swap (conversion forcing calls). 
 3 
However, future refunding may not be the only reason why firms issue callable 
bonds.  In the United States, firms relied on callable bonds more heavily during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, when the market interest rate kept rising, than during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, when the market interest rate kept falling.  The one-year Treasury bill rate 
in the secondary market showed a uniform increase from 4.64% in December 1976 to 
14.7% in August 1981.  Thereafter, the market interest rate fluctuated, generally going 
down, but remained above 10% until September 1984.  The one-year Treasury bill rate 
uniformly decreased from 9.93% in October 1984 to 3.33% in July 1993.  According to 
Moody’s Industrial Manuals, about 90% of the listed bonds issued from the late 1970s to 
1982 were callable, whereas only about 60% of all bonds issued since 1983 have been 
callable. 
This paper empirically analyzes the call decision of firms to see how 
recapitalization opportunities, cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, and private 
information affect the call decision.  This paper differs from previous studies and, indeed, 
has several advantages over them.  Harris and Raviv (1985) analyzed the calling of a 
callable convertible bond but ignored the actual call structure.  In their model, a firm is 
assumed to have a callable convertible bond with a call price of zero so that the firm can 
always force a conversion.  Unlike Harris and Raviv, this paper takes into account the 
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actual call structures in analyzing the call timing.  Vu (1986) examined the stock price 
reaction to calling a non-convertible bond.  Unlike Vu, this paper directly analyzes the 
decision to call using survival analysis techniques, and thus better addresses the call design 
and call timing issues. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature.  Section 3 sketches the theoretical predictions and draws testable hypotheses 
regarding the effect on call timing of the cost of financial distress, the agency cost of debt, 
information asymmetry, and refunding opportunity.  Section 4 discusses various 
measurement issues and describes the empirical model.  Section 5 identifies the data 
sources and presents selective summary statistics.  Section 6 shows the estimation results 
for each of the non-convertible bonds and convertible bonds.  Section 7 concludes the paper.  
Other details relating to measurement issues, summary statistics, and empirical results can 
be found in the Appendix. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
To explain the prevalence of callable debt, previous studies have investigated 
whether a callable bond has a relative advantage over a non-callable bond or straight equity.  
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These studies have identified several advantages of a callable bond including its ability to 
facilitate recapitalization, mitigate default cost, provide tax subsidy, and signal private 
information. 
 
2.1 Literature related to callable non-convertible debt 
 
The literature suggests that the most prominent function of a callable bond is to 
facilitate recapitalization in the future.  For a non-convertible bond, a call provision 
facilitates the issuing of a new security.  For instance, Pye (1966) views a call provision as 
a pure option to facilitate refunding when the market interest rate falls.  Vu (1986) suggests 
that a call provision is included to facilitate removing restrictive financing covenants and 
thus to facilitate recapitalization.  He finds that firms are willing to pay a higher call 
premium if calling removes a restrictive covenant.  Narayanan and Lim (1989) also find 
evidences supporting Vu’s findings.  Many callable zero-coupon bonds have restrictive 
covenants compared with non-callable counterparts because they can be removed by calling. 
Smith and Warner (1979) postulate that a call provision mitigates the agency cost 
of debt.  When a firm is in debt, the manager who acts in the interests of the shareholders 
may attempt to extract bondholder wealth in favor of the shareholders.  This action 
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typically entails increasing the firm’s risk, which does not necessarily lead to firm value 
maximization.  Bondholders rationally expect this kind of managerial incentive distortion 
when evaluating the value of a bond at the time of purchase, which results in firm value 
reduction ultimately damaging the shareholder interests.  A call provision mitigates this 
type of agency cost because it facilitates refunding before maturity.  This is because the 
manager’s action to reduce firm value is penalized later at the time of refunding. 
Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) postulate that firms have the incentive to call 
bonds as soon as the recapitalization benefits the shareholders.  The call time that serves 
shareholders’ interests comes earlier than the call time that maximizes firm value, creating 
a potential agency cost of recapitalization.  Bondholders demand a higher coupon rate to 
compensate for an early redemption.  The resulting higher coupon rate becomes a burden to 
the firm.  Since a firm eventually bears this kind of agency cost, it attempts to pre-commit 
to calling no earlier than the firm-value maximizing time.  This explains why many callable 
bonds have so-called call protection periods, whether absolute or conditional, immediately 
after issuance. 
Under a condition of information asymmetry, the call option benefits firms, 
especially good ones, by providing them with recapitalization opportunities.  A good firm 
can easily refund by calling outstanding debts after favorable information is released. 
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2.2 Literature related to callable convertible debt  
 
Callable convertible bonds are equity-like as well as debt-like issues.  They can 
replicate the cash flows of issuing callable non-convertible bonds followed by those of 
issuing straight equity. 
Several studies have examined whether the types of bonds issued signal private 
information.  Stein (1992) suggests that good firms issue long-term debts to signal their 
good type while bad firms issue callable convertible debts to reduce default risk.  Good 
firms can manage risks arising from the issuing of a long-term bond, whereas bad firms 
cannot.  According to Stein, when callable convertible bonds are issued for deferred equity 
financing under information asymmetry, a good firm forces a conversion by calling the 
bonds after favorable information is released. 
Smith and Warner (1979) and Green (1984) postulate that a callable convertible 
debt mitigates the aforementioned agency cost of debt more efficiently than a callable non-
convertible bond does.  As discussed earlier, the call option mitigates the agency cost of 
debt because it offers a refunding opportunity before maturity.  The conversion option 
further mitigates the agency cost of debt because it offers bondholders the right to 
eventually be shareholders.  In equity-financed firms, shareholder wealth maximization 
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complies with firm value maximization, thus avoiding the agency cost of debt.  According 
to this view, callable convertible bonds are a debt-like issue. 
Dann and Mikkelson (1984) find that common shareholders earn significantly 
negative abnormal returns both at the announcement of a convertible bond offering and at 
issuance.  In contrast, the effect of a non-convertible bond offering is only marginally 
negative at the initial announcement and almost zero at issuance.  They conclude that 
convertible bonds are an equity-like issue. 
The optimal timing of call and conversion has also been studied in the literature.  
Brennan and Schwartz (1977) claim that it is optimal for firms to call a convertible bond as 
soon as the conversion value exceeds the call price.  Ingersoll (1977) finds that in practice 
calling is deferred long after the optimal timing predicted by Brennan and Schwartz (1977).  
Harris and Raviv (1985) attempt to resolve this apparent discrepancy using a signaling 
argument under a condition of information asymmetry.  According to them, good firms 
voluntarily choose to defer calling to signal their good type, whereas poor firms are less 
likely to defer calling because they have higher probabilities of being unable to force a 
conversion in a later stage.  Further, Wee (1995) suggests that a callable convertible bond is 
designed to be converted if the realized return of the issuing firm is relatively low.  
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Empirical studies support that calling a convertible bond is related with low 
performance of a firm.  Lin and Chen (1991) find that stock prices show a negative reaction 
to the announcement of calling a convertible bond.  Ofer and Natarajan (1987) document a 
drop in profitability upon calling a convertible bond. 
 
3. The determinants of call timing: a theoretical overview 
 
This paper studies how calling a callable bond is influenced by firm characteristics 
and market conditions.  Using survival analysis techniques, this paper empirically analyzes 
the impact on call decisions of movements in the market interest rate, the transaction cost of 
refunding, the cost of financial distress, the agency cost of debt, revealed information after 
issuance, the structure of the call clause, the change in stock price, and the elapsed time 
since issuance.  The theoretical predictions are briefly outlined below. 
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3.1 Refunding opportunity 
 
Refunding opportunity affects the decision to call.  Market interest rate movements 
and the transaction cost of refunding influence the call timing.  Stock price movements also 
matter in the case of callable convertible bonds. 
 
(1) Non-convertible bonds 
 
The decision to call a non-convertible bond depends crucially on the availability of 
refunding opportunity and the transaction cost of refunding.  A firm is more likely to 
exercise the call option when the spread between the bond’s interest rate and the market 
interest rate gets larger, and less likely to call when the transaction cost of refunding 
becomes larger. 
This paper proxies the market interest rate with the one-year Treasury bill rate in 
the secondary market.  The secondary market rate is preferred to the auction rate because 
the secondary market is deeper.  The interest rate spread is measured by the bond’s interest 
rate minus the one-year Treasury bill rate. 
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We postulate that there are economies of scale in refunding transactions, and that 
the unit refunding cost decreases with the size of refunding amount.  This amount is 
expected to expedite the calling.  We use the authorized amount of bond issue as a proxy 
for the refunding amount.  We postulate that the unit refunding cost decreases as the natural 
logarithm of the authorized amount of bond issue gets larger. 
 
(2) Convertible bonds 
 
Refunding opportunity has a different impact on calling a convertible bond, 
depending on whether a call is conversion forcing or not.  In the case of a non-conversion 
forcing call, calling is more likely when the market interest rate falls below the bond’s 
interest rate and when the transaction cost of refunding is low.  A conversion forcing call is 
more likely when the conversion value is higher than the conversion price (value of the 
bond submitted for conversion).  The interest rate difference is less important in 
determining the time to exercise the conversion forcing call. 
The conversion value of a convertible bond increases in the stock price.  We use 
the stock price as a proxy of the conversion value.  For each issue of the callable 
convertible bonds, we have normalized the corresponding stock price as one at the time of 
 12
issuance, and then have constructed its price path using the monthly rates of return.  
Monthly rates of return are adjusted for stock split, dividend payment, etc. 
To sum up, we expect that calling a convertible bond is more likely as the interest 
rate spread widens, as the unit refunding transaction cost decreases, and as the conversion 
value rises. 
 
3.2 The cost of financial distress 
 
A firm is in financial distress when the value of total liabilities exceeds the value 
of total assets including future business opportunities.  Under a condition of financial 
distress, a firm is likely to go through financial restructuring or liquidation. 
Financial distress is costly.  First, restructuring or liquidation normally incurs a 
considerable amount of administrative cost, including legal expenses.  The resale value of 
assets during restructuring or liquidation is likely to be lower than the value under the 
original firm.  Second, bondholders are in general different from managers and 
shareholders.  After restructuring, the former bondholders usually emerge as new 
shareholders.  They tend to be less efficient at managing the firm or at monitoring 
professional managers compared with the original shareholders. 
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Rationally expecting the possibility of financial distress, creditors properly 
incorporate the expected cost of such distress when evaluating the value of a bond issue.  
This way, a default risk eventually costs the shareholders.  In response, firms issue callable 
convertible bonds to reduce the chance of financial distress.  By exercising call option 
embedded in callable convertible bonds, firms forces debt-equity swap without having to 
raise new funds.  They tend to have a stronger incentive to exercise the call option and thus 
to avoid financial distress as the cost of financial distress becomes larger.  Calling a 
convertible bond will be expedited as the cost of financial distress gets larger. 
Non-convertible bonds do not quite serve this purpose.  Calling entails 
recapitalization.  To retire existing debts by calling non-convertible bonds, firms have to 
raise new funds.  The cost of financial distress is not expected to have any significant effect 
on calling a callable non-convertible bond.   
In the case of callable convertible bonds, firms face an incentive to exercise the 
call option either to redeem the bond or to induce a conversion when the cost of financial 
distress is high.  Firms become equity- financed and thus free from additional borrowing 
once their convertible debts are converted into shares.  Thus, faced with financing 
difficulties, managers are more willing to call the callable convertibles than the non-
convertibles. 
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This paper proxies the cost of financial distress with the size of firm-specific assets.  
Firm-specific assets have a relatively low resale value at restructuring or liquidation 
compared with assets for general use.  The paper measures the size of firm-specific assets 
by the proportion of fixed assets to total assets.  Fixed assets include both tangibles and 
intangibles, whereas current assets are mostly cash, securities, and inventories.  Intangibles 
are regarded as more fixed in nature than tangibles.  Fixed assets, like intangibles, lose 
more of their value through resale. 
 
3.3 The agency cost of debt 
 
When a firm is in debt, a manager’s action to maximize shareholder wealth does 
not necessarily comply with firm value maximization (see, for example, Barnea et al. 1980).  
This incentive distortion tends to be severe for firms that are highly in debt. 
This cost is mitigated if the manager expects to recapitalize in the future.  Thus, 
calling is delayed when the potential agency cost of debt, as measured by the amount of the 
debt, is large.  The presence of an unexercised call option mitigates a manager’s incentive 
distortion.  This is because the manager’s commitment to firm-value maximization is 
rewarded when the firm recapitalizes.  As a result, firms that are in debt tend to defer 
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calling and leave call options unexercised.  This effect is expected to be stronger for the 
non-convertible bonds than for the convertible bonds since the possibility of forced 
refunding is higher in the case of calling the non-convertible bonds. 
We proxy this agency cost of debt with the indebtedness, measured by the ratio of 
total liability to total asset. 
 
3.4 Information asymmetry 
 
Suppose that firms are classified as either good type or bad type depending on 
their profitability.  Suppose also that there is information asymmetry in that firms know 
what type they are but the investors do not.  In this situation, a good firm suffers from 
adverse selection.  It will try to mitigate this problem by issuing callable bonds, expecting 
that its type will hopefully be revealed after bond issuance. 
A good firm exercises the call option to recapitalize in a more favorable term after 
the information is released.  We expect that a firm is more likely to call a bond when 
favorable information is released.  We proxy this information release with the profitability 
of firms after the issuance, measured by the ratio of net income to total assets.  This 
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variable is expected to expedite the calling of a callable bond, whether convertible or non-
convertible. 
 
4. Measurement issues and the empirical model 
 
This paper analyzes the time to call, measured by the interval from the time when 
calling becomes possible to the time when calling is in fact made.  This paper uses the term 
“time to call” instead of the usual term “duration.”  This is to avoid a possible confusion 
because “duration” is a term reserved to represent the weighted average maturity of a bond 
in finance. 
By using survival analysis techniques, this paper estimates the hazard rate of call 
timing.  The hazard rate shows the call intensity at each moment in time as a function of the 
available information at that time. 
 
4.1 The measurement of the time to call 
 
In practice, measuring the time to call of a callable bond is not straightforward 
because of the different structures that appear across different callable bonds.  Time 
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horizons are different for different bonds.  Protection periods exist for some but not for 
others.  The absolute call protection periods that prohibit calling under any circumstance, 
range from several months to several years when they exist.  The conditional call protection 
periods that prohibit calling unless a certain pre-specified condition is met, may or may not 
exist.  When they exist, they range from several months to several years.  Also, the time 
intervals from the end of the absolute call protection period to call expiration are all 
different. 
Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical life path of a callable bond.  There are four 
possible time points: 0t , 1t , 2t , and 3t  in increasing order.  A firm issues a callable bond at 
time 0t . The bond matures at time 3t .  The bond is not callable until 1t  in any circumstance.  
In some cases, a bond is not callable further until 2t  elapses under a certain set of 
conditions.  After 2t , the bond is callable without restriction. 
We call the time interval from 0t  to 1t  an absolute call protection period, and the 
time interval from 1t  to 2t  a conditional call protection period.  When there is no absolute 
call protection period, we have 10 tt = .  When there is no conditional call protection period, 
we have 21 tt = . 
The conditional call protection clause takes a different form depending on whether 
the bond is convertible or not.  In the case of a non-convertible bond, the bond is not 
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callable before 2t  when refunding is made at a lower interest rate than the bond’s interest 
rate.  This is to protect the bondholder from a forced reinvestment as a result of the call, for 
which the return is likely to be lower than the retiring bond’s interest rate.  In the case of a 
callable convertible bond, the bond is not callable until 2t  elapses unless the corresponding 
stock price exceeds a certain level for a specified length of time.  This is to guarantee the 
bondholder a minimum conversion value at an earlier stage. 
 
<Figure 1> The hypothetical life path of callable bonds: from issuance to maturity 
 
Now, let us consider how to define the time to call in a meaningful way.  The time 
to call is the time interval from the end of the absolute call protection period to the actual 
call time.  It measures how long the bond issuer waits until he exercises the call option after 
bond issued (t0) 
strict call protection ends (t1) 
bond expires (t3) 
time 
conditional call protection ends (t2) 
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calling becomes possible.  The absolute length of calendar time, however, is not a good 
measure.  Calling a callable bond after one year of call eligibility has different implication 
depending on whether the bond has a longer life span or a shorter one.   
To illustrate, let us take two callable bonds differing in their callable life spans.  
Suppose that one bond has a 10-year life span and the other bond has just a 5-year life span.  
If both bonds were called after one year of call eligibility, the call would have been 
exercised earlier in relative terms for the first bond than for the second.  The first bond is 
called at 10% location in its life span, whereas the second bond is called at 20%. 
We adopt percentage life as a measure of normalized time to call.  The percentage 
life is defined as the ratio )/()( 131 ttttc −− , where ct  is the observed call time if a call is 
made and is equal to 3t  if no call is made until maturity.  The use of percentage life allows 
us to compare the time to call across different bonds. 
Call observations are classified into three categories.  First, there are bonds that are 
called during the sample period.  These are complete observations because a call is actually 
observed.  These bonds have a value of normalized time to call of less than one.  Second, 
there are bonds that are neither called nor matured by the end of the sample period.  These 
bonds are incomplete in spell and have a value of normalized time to call of less than one.  
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Finally, there are bonds that are not called until maturity.  We say these observations are 
maturity censored.  For these observations, the normalized time to call takes a value of one. 
 
4.2 Controlling for heterogeneity in the structure of the call protection period 
 
A callable bond may or may not have a conditional call protection clause.  
However, we measure the time to call from the end of the absolute call protection period 
whether there is a conditional call protection clause or not.  Thus, the time to call variable 
may suffer from heterogeneity arising from whether a bond has a conditional call protection 
period or not. 
Even though there is a conditional call protection clause, a manager may choose to 
avoid it and thus exercise the call before the expiration of the conditional call protection.  
This choice could be costly.  For example, in the case of non-convertibles, the manager has 
to bypass opportunities of refunding at a lower interest rate to avoid the protection clause 
and thus be able to call early.  Bypassing these opportunities is costly.  Thus, the manager is 
less likely to make such a choice faced with a conditional call protection clause.  We want 
to see whether this kind of effect in fact exists. 
 21
To capture differences in call patterns depending on whether there exists a 
conditional call protection clause or not, we first define a dummy variable (say, a call 
protection dummy) that takes a value of one if there is a conditional call protection clause 
and if this clause is currently binding, and zero otherwise.  For callable bonds with 
conditional call protection clauses, this dummy variable becomes time varying.  It takes a 
value of one during the conditional call protection period and zero thereafter.  Of course, 
for callable bonds without a conditional call protection clause, this dummy variable takes a 
value of zero throughout.   
The hazard rate should then be estimated separately for convertible bonds and non-
convertible bonds, with the dummy variable included in each specification.  Through the 
dummy, we want to see whether a conditional call protection clause in fact has a delaying 
effect on the time to call. 
 
4.3 The empirical model 
 
The empirical model we use is a hazard rate model specified as follows: 
 
)'exp()()|( 0 βtt xthxth = , 
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where )|( txth  is the call hazard rate at time t  given tx , )(0 th  is the so-called baseline 
hazard function, tx  is a collection of the explanatory variables available at time t , and β  is 
a vector of unknown parameters.  To make it always positive, let us represent )(0 th  as 
))(exp()( 00 tgth =  so that the resulting hazard function becomes: 
 
)')(exp()|( 0 βtt xtgxth += . 
 
To complete the model, we need to specify )(0 tg .  We use a step function for 
)(0 tg  by introducing a set of time dummy variables to partition the unit interval.  To design 
the partition to be used, we consider a trade-off between flexibility and reliability.  If more 
steps are estimated, the resulting function is more flexible but less reliable, and vice versa.  
The chosen intervals in the step function are progressively wider over time to avoid the 
problem of thin data at later times.  We end up partitioning the unit interval into five sub-
intervals, {[0,0.1], (0.1, 0.2], (0.2, 0.3], (0.3, 0.5], (0.5, 1]}, by introducing four time 
dummy variables indicating the first four intervals together with an overall constant term.  
The coefficient of the first dummy variable shows whether the call hazard rate is higher (+) 
or lower (-) in the first sub-interval (birth to 10% of age) relative to the second half of the 
callable life span, and similarly for other dummies. 
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To test the theoretical implications using the time to call data, we let tx  include 
those variables discussed and defined in previous sections.  Many explanatory variables are 
time varying in nature.  Since a firm’s financial situation and other environments keep 
changing, it is a better idea to use these time varying explanatory variables to explain a 
manager’s decision to call at each moment in time.  To control for the presence/absence of 
the conditional call protection, we also let tx  include the call protection dummy. 
To sum, the set of variables used in the model specification are as follows.  
 
Baseline hazard function:  D[0,0.1], D(0.1,0.2], D(0.2,0.3] and D(0.3,0.5] are time-dummy 
variables defined on the intervals [0,0.1], (0.1,0.2], (0.2,0.3] and (0.3,0.5] respectively.  
These four dummy variables together with an overall constant term model the baseline 
hazard function as a step function with five steps.  
 
Time varying covariates:  FASS is the ratio, (fixed asset)/(total asset).  DEBT is the ratio, 
[(total liability)/(total asset)].  PRO is the ratio, (net income)/(total asset).  DFREE is the 
dummy variable measuring freedom from conditional call protection periods. It takes the 
value 0 if the callable bond is prohibited from being called by a conditional protection 
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clause, and 1 otherwise.  DINT is the difference, the bond’s interest rate (%) minus the one-
year Treasury bill rate (%).  
 
Time constant covariates:  Ln(Amount) is the natural logarithm of the authorized amount of 
the bond issue measured in 1 million dollars.  Callable life span is the length of time from 
the end of the absolute call protection period to maturity measured in 100 thousand days. 
 The above variables are commonly used for the hazard rate specification of the 
non-convertible bonds and the convertible bonds.  In the case of the convertible bonds, 
VCONV is additionally used.  VCONV is the normalized stock price so that the price at the 
time of issuance is one.  VCONV is time-varying. 
 
4.4 The baseline hazard 
 
Existing literature provides implications for the shape of the baseline hazard 
function.  Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) show that a manager has incentive to call a 
bond as soon as it is in the interest of the shareholders. They further show that this 
shareholder-wealth maximizing time of calling is earlier than the firm-value maximizing 
time, i.e., there is a potential incentive problem of recapitalization.  To mitigate this agency 
 25
cost, a firm can set the expiration of a call protection period matching the firm-value 
maximizing time.  Thus, a firm has incentive to call a bond immediately after the expiration 
of a call protection period because the total gain from recapitalization decreases as calling 
is further deferred. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
<Figure 2> Call protection as a device to curb incentive distortion of recapitalization 
 
We expect that this incentive be reflected in the shape of the baseline hazard 
function.  Recall that we measure the time to call from the end of the absolute call 
protection period.  Thus, the time origin coincides with the end of any call protection 
periods for bonds without a conditional call protection clause.  For these bonds, we expect 
the baseline hazard function to exhibit a monotonically decreasing pattern. 
intensity to call 
0 shareholder-wealth 
maximizing time 
firm-value maximizing
time (end of call
protection period) 
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Time zero is not necessarily the end of call protection period for bonds with a 
conditional call protection clause.  For these bonds, the effective ending of call protection 
varies a lot depending on the structure of the conditional call clauses and also on whether 
the condition is met or not.  Figures 6 and 7 in the appendix show that there is lots of 
variation in the normalized length of conditional call protection periods.  We do not expect 
any visible baseline hazard pattern for these bonds with conditional call protection. 
The above pattern is expected to emerge from curbing the agency cost of debt.  We 
expect this pattern is stronger for bonds of a debt nature and weaker for bonds sharing an 
equity nature.  Non-convertible bonds are more like a debt than convertible bonds.  We 
expect the monotone decreasing baseline pattern most visible in calling non-convertible 
bonds without a conditional call protection clause.  For other bonds, the baseline pattern is 
expected to be weak or invisible. 
 
4.5 The construction of the likelihood function 
 
To construct the likelihood function, we need to compute the probabilities of the 
following two forms:  
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)( tTf =  or )( tTP > , 10 ≤≤ t , 
 
where the first denotes the density of the event tT =  (a complete observation) and the 
second denotes the probability of the event tT >  (right-censored, whether incomplete or 
maturity censored). 
To illustrate, let us assign a likelihood value to both the complete event 35.0=T  
and the right-censored event 35.0>T .  First, in the case of a complete observation, 
35.0=T  means that a callable bond survives 35% of its callable life and then is called 
immediately at 35% location of its callable life span.  By using a relationship between the 
hazard rate function and the density function, we end up with 
.)'exp()(exp)'exp()35.0()35.0(
35.0
0 035.00 

−== ∫ duxuhxhTf u ββ  Second, in the 
case of a right-censored observation, 35.0>T  means that a callable bond is only known to 
have survived 35% of its callable life.  Similarly, we find 
.)'exp()(exp)35.0(
35.0
0 0 

−=> ∫ duxuhTP u β  
Here arise several issues that need to be addressed in order to compute the above 
likelihood values from the available data.  First, the time varying explanatory variables are 
recorded according to the calendar time (either monthly or yearly), not the normalized time.  
Therefore, we need to rearrange the data on time varying explanatory variables according to 
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the normalized time.  Since the time horizons are all different across different callable 
bonds, this has to be done on an individual basis (the details of this are in the Appendix).  
Once this has been done, assigning the above likelihood values is trivial.  This is because 
the integration reduces to summation due to the discrete nature of the time varying 
explanatory variables as well as the baseline hazard function. 
 
5. Data 
 
In this section, we explain the data sources and present basic descriptive statistics 
before carrying out the survival analyses in the next section (additional summary statistics 
can be found in the Appendix). 
 
5.1 Data sources 
 
The sample of callable bonds is taken from those listed in Moody’s Industrial 
Manuals.  The sample bonds were issued between September 1, 1980 and December 31, 
1991.  Moody’s Manuals provide important features of bonds, specifically, issuance date, 
call protection period, maturity, face value, coupon rate, and call date.  Data needed to 
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construct explanatory variables are collected from Compustat files, the Citibank database, 
CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) files, and the International Financial 
Statistics.  Compustat files provide firm characteristics such as net income, liabilities, net 
fixed assets, and total assets.  The market interest rates are taken from the Citibank database.  
CRSP files provide rates of return data.  As a relevant price index, we use the industrial 
price index available from the International Financial Statistics. 
The sample excludes callable bonds that are retired or suspected to have retired 
before or after a major merger or acquisition.  Specifically, the sample excludes the bonds 
called by either an acquiring or an acquired firm within 12 months before and 6 months 
after a major merger or acquisition.  The sample also excludes bonds wherein the issuing 
firm goes bankrupt after issuance.  This is to preclude observations that are likely to show 
different call patterns.  Also, we exclude data points that lack some relevant information 
such as financial ratios or the coupon rate.  In the end, we have 586 usable observations for 
callable non-convertible bonds and 166 usable observations for callable convertible bonds.  
 
5.2 statistics 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show selected sample data used in this paper. 
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<Table 1> Selected sample data: callable non-convertible bonds1 
Company name 
Issuance 
Date 
Acquisition 
Date 
End of  
absolute 
call 
protection 
End of 
conditional 
call 
protection 
Call 
date 
Expiration 
date 
Abbott Industries 19830201 . . 19930201 19870101 20130201 
Abbott Industries 19830201 . 19900201 . 19900201 19930201 
Allied Siganl Inc (Allied Corp) 19831001 19850919 . 19941101 19870227 20091101 
American Medical Holdings Inc 19840115 . 19910115 . 19911108 19940115 
American Medical Holdings Inc 19840115 . . 19940115 19870819 20140115 
American Medical Holdings Inc 19850601 . 19920601 . 19920610 19950601 
American Medical Holdings Inc 19850601 . . 19950601 19930701 20150601 
American Medical Holdings Inc 19860115 . 19900115 . 19910115 19910115 
American Medical Holdings Inc 19860201 . 19910201 . 19930201 19930201 
Armco Inc 19811201 . 19851201 . 19860101 19861201 
Atlantic Richfield Co 19811201 . . . 19911201 19911201 
Atlantic Richfield Co 19820915 . . 19920915 19870430 20120915 
Atlantic Richfield Co 19830415 . . 19930415 19900301 20130415 
Atlantic Richfield Co 19850601 . . 19950601 19900301 20150601 
Atlantic Richfield Co 19851015 . 19921015 . 19930101 19951015 
Atlantic Richfield Co 19860101 . 19930101 . 19930101 19960101 
Baxter Int'l Inc 19870615 . 19880615 . 19930701 20180615 
Baxter Int'l Inc (American Hosp. Supply) 19820815 19851125 19890901 . 19890901 19920901 
Cabot Corp 19820801 . . . 19860930 19920801 
Cabot Corp 19841101 . . 19911101 19870427 19941101 
Cabot Corp 19850901 . . 19920901 19880427 19950901 
Chevron Corp 19841101 . 19911101 . 19920101 19941101 
Chevron Corp 19860301 . 19930301 . 19930516 19960301 
Chevron Corp 19860415 . 19930415 . 19930416 19960415 
Chevron Corp 19850201 . 19890201 . 19900201 19900201 
Chevron Corp 19850601 . 19920601 . 19920616 19950601 
Comdisco Inc 19860515 . 19920515 . 19920629 19940515 
Data General Corp 19850515 . . 19950515 19870518 20150515 
Digital Equipment Corp 19840401 . 19910415 . 19910415 19940415 
Digital Equipment Corp 19840415 . . 19940415 19860619 20140415 
 
                                                          
1 
In the case of acquisition, the firm within parentheses is acquired by the firm outside.  If a firm which has issued a callable 
bond is acquired by another firm during the life of the callable bond, we use the acquisition date instead of the original 
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<Table 2> Selected sample data: callable convertible bonds 
Company name 
Issuance 
date 
Acquisition 
date 
End of  
absolute 
call 
protection 
End of 
conditional 
call 
protection 
Call 
date 
Expiration 
date 
Action Industries Inc 19830401  19850401  19930701 19980401 
Anacomp Inc 19820115  19840115 19870115 19930701 20020115 
Anacomp Inc 19840701    19870507 19950701 
Automatic Data Processing Inc 19850215   19870215 19870216 20100215 
Automatic Data Processing Inc 19860301   19890101 19891116 20110301 
Black & Decker Corp 19870715   19900715 19900101 20020715 
Boise Cascade Corp 19860501   19890301 19930701 20160501 
Bowater Inc 19841215    19870224 20091215 
Browning-Ferris Industries Inc 19870801  19900815  19930701 20120815 
Caesars World Inc 19860401   19880401 19870701 20060401 
Champion Int'l Corp 19860415   19890422 19930701 20110415 
Comdisco Inc 19830501   19841101 19860701 20030501 
Crane Co 19851001   19871001 19870331 20051001 
Deere & Company 19830315   19850315 19871016 20080315 
Diagnostic/Retrieval Systems Inc 19830801  19850801  19930801 19930801 
Digital Equipment Corp 19840901   19860916 19860417 20090901 
Dole Food Co Inc 19830615    19870101 20130615 
Eaton Corp 19831216  19851215  19870116 20081215 
EDO Corp 19861215   19891215 19930701 20111215 
Emerson Electric Co (Liebert Corp) 19851115   19871201 19930701 20101115 
Flowers Industries Inc 19850301   19870301 19920819 20050301 
General Dynamics Corp (Cessna Aircraft Co) 19830701 19860316 19850701  19900101 20080701 
Gillette Co 19821112  19830301  19860701 20130301 
Grow Group Inc 19860201    19930625 20060201 
Grumman Corp 19840815   19870815 19930707 20090815 
H.J.Heinz Co 19850215  19880215  19900101 20150215 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc 19860315   19890315 19880101 20110315 
Hercules Inc 19850815  19880815  19930701 20100815 
Int'l Paper Co 19870923   19900923 19930701 20020923 
Int'l Paper Co 19870315   19890315 19911121 20120315 
Int'l Rectifier Corp 19850615  19870615  19910614 20100615 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
issuance date as the birth date of the bond. 
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Table 3 cross-tabulates the sample callable bonds by convertibility, 
presence/absence of an absolute call protection clause, and presence/absence of a 
conditional call protection clause.  As can be seen, most callable bonds have either an 
absolute call protection clause or a conditional call protection clause, but seldom both.  We 
infer that the two types of call protection clause function as substitutes rather than as 
complements in protecting investors. 
 
<Table 3> Joint distribution of absolute and conditional call protection clauses 
Conditional call protection period 
Non-convertible bonds 
Exist Not exist 
Exist 0.04 0.48 
Absolute call 
protection period 
Not exist 0.36 0.12 
Conditional call protection period 
Convertible bonds 
Exist Not exist 
Exist 0.03 0.26 
Absolute call 
protection period 
Not exist 0.50 0.21 
 
For call protection, non-convertible bonds prefer an absolute call protection to a 
conditional counterpart.  It is opposite for the convertible bonds.  This difference seems to 
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reflect that investors in non-convertible bonds care for a safe long-term investment whereas 
investors in convertible bonds care for possibility of conversion before maturity. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of the length of the absolute call protection 
period )( 01 tt −  when it exists for the sub-sample of callable non-convertible bonds and the 
sub-sample of callable convertible bonds.  The mean length of the absolute call protection 
period is 5.14 years for the non-convertibles, and it is 2.28 years for the convertibles.  On 
the average, the absolute call protection period is longer for the non-convertible bonds than 
for the convertibles, lending another support to the fact that non-convertible bonds are more 
of a debt compared with convertible bonds. 
 
<Figure 3> Histogram showing length of absolute call protection period: 
callable non-convertible bonds with an absolute call protection period 
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<Figure 4> Histogram showing length of absolute call protection period: 
callable convertible bonds with an absolute call protection period 
 
 
Table 4 shows a classification of the sample data by convertibility and censoring 
status.  An observation is said to be complete when its call time is observed within the 
sampling horizon )10,( <<= ttT .  An observation is said to be incomplete when its call 
option has not been exercised by the end of the sample observation period, which comes 
before maturity )10,( <<> ttT .  Finally, an observation is said to be maturity censored 
when its call option has not been exercised by the maturity )1( >T .  
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<Table 4> Classification of sample data by convertibility and censoring status 
Non-convertible bonds Convertible bonds 
 
Total 
Number 
Proportion 
(%) 
Total 
Number 
Proportion 
(%) 
Complete 367 62.6 88 53.0 
Incomplete 173 29.5 77 46.4 
Maturity censored 46 7.8 1 0.6 
Total 586 100.0 166 100.0 
 
Table 5 shows mean and standard deviation of the covariates used in our empirical 
model for each sub-sample of the non-convertible bonds and the convertible bonds. 
 
<Table 5> Mean and standard deviation of covariates used for estimation 
Non-convertible bonds Convertible bonds 
 
Mean SD Mean SD 
FASS 0.4122 0.2121 0.3277 0.1954 
DEBT 0.3664 0.2005 0.3635 0.1727 
PRO 0.0302 0.0883 0.0184 0.0982 
DFREE 0.4199 0.4935 0.7231 0.4475 
DINT(%) 4.3366 2.8072 1.6321 2.3813 
Ln(Amount) 4.7550 0.8401 3.9784 0.9452 
VCONV . . 0.9678 0.5489 
Callable life span 
(year) 13.7034 11.5003 21.2006 4.9861 
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Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of the callable life span )( 13 tt −  for the sub-
sample of callable non-convertible bonds and the sub-sample of callable convertible bonds.  
Here we are using an absolute time scale, not a relative one.  By looking at these figures, 
we can see how the callable life span has different lengths across different callable bonds. 
 
<Figure 5> Histogram showing callable life span: callable non-convertible bonds 
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<Figure 6> Histogram showing callable life span: callable convertible bonds 
 
 
6. Results 
 
In this section, we present the estimation results for the call hazard rate function 
for each of the non-convertible bonds and the convertible bonds.  Tables 6 and 7 show these 
results.  In the Appendix, we also present other call hazard function estimates.  For this 
purpose, each sub-sample of the non-convertible bonds and the convertible bonds are 
further classified according to the presence or absence of the conditional call protection 
period.  Tables 9-12 in the Appendix show these results.  Findings are basically the same as 
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those reported in Tables 6 and 7 other than that the statistical significance in general drops 
due to sample split. 
 
<Table 6> Call hazard function estimates: non-convertible bonds 
Variable Estimate Expected Sign 
Standard 
 error t-value p-value 
Constant -2.62  0.38 -6.97 0.00  
D[0,0.1] 1.57  0.22 7.15 0.00  
D(0.1,0.2) 0.77  0.23 3.36 0.00  
D(0.2,0.3) 0.83  0.24 3.46 0.00  
D(0.3,0.5) 0.78  0.23 3.45 0.00  
FASS 0.39  0.34 1.15 0.25  
DEBT -2.23  0.40 -5.59 0.00  
PRO 4.98  1.21 4.10 0.00  
DFREE 0.66  0.18 3.61 0.00  
DINT 0.12  0.06 1.95 0.05  
DINT•Ln(Amount) 0.06  0.01 5.35 0.00  
Callable life span 5.75  2.36 2.44 0.01  
D[0,0.1], D(0.1,0.2], D(0.2,0.3] and D(0.3,0.5] are time-dummy variables defined on the intervals [0,0.1], (0.1,0.2], (0.2,0.3] 
and (0.3,0.5] respectively.  
FASS is the ratio, (fixed asset)/(total asset).  
DEBT is the ratio, [(total liability)/(total asset)].  
PRO is the ratio, (net income)/(total asset).  
DFREE is the dummy variable measuring freedom from conditional call protection periods. It is time varying and takes the 
value 0 if the callable bond is prohibited from being called by a conditional protection clause, and 1 otherwise.  
DINT is the difference, the bond’s interest rate minus the one-year Treasury bill rate.   
Ln(Amount) is the natural logarithm of the authorized amount of the bond issue measured in 1 million dollars.  
Callable life span is the length of time from t1 to t3 measured in 100 thousand days. 
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<Table 7> Call hazard function estimates: convertible bonds 
Variable Estimate Expected Sign 
Standard 
error t-value p-value 
Constant -4.78  1.24 -3.84 0.00  
D[0,0.1] 0.87  0.76 1.15 0.25  
D(0.1,0.2] 1.30  0.69 1.87 0.06  
D(0.2,0.3] 0.36  0.77 0.47 0.64  
D(0.3,0.5] 0.74  0.71 1.04 0.30  
FASS 0.90  0.52 1.72 0.09  
DEBT 1.39  0.93 1.49 0.14  
PRO 6.48  2.32 2.80 0.01  
DFREE 0.67  0.37 1.82 0.07  
DINT -0.13  0.12 -1.07 0.29  
DINT•Ln(Amount) 0.09  0.04 2.28 0.02  
VCONV 1.11  0.20 5.69 0.00  
Callable life span 20.49  9.82 2.09 0.04  
VCONV is the normalized stock price so that the price at the time of issuance is one. 
 
The findings can be summarized as follows.  First, calling a non-convertible bond 
is not expedited as the cost of financial distress increases.  This effect is not statistically 
significant for the callable non-convertible bonds, whereas this effect is marginally 
significant at 10% level for the callable convertible bonds.  Calling a convertible bond is 
weakly expedited as the cost of financial distress increases.  Comparing Tables 9-12 in the 
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Appendix, this effect is only statistically significant for the convertible bonds without a 
conditional call protection clause. 
Second, calling tends to be deferred in the case of callable non-convertible bonds 
if the potential agency cost of debt is large.  This effect cannot be found for the callable 
convertible bonds (wrong in sign, though insignificant).  This supports the postulation that 
the distortion of manager incentive in a levied firm can be mitigated if a callable non-
convertible bond is outstanding.  Results in Tables 9-12 in the Appendix are basically the 
same. 
Third, a firm tends to speed up calling if favorable information is released after 
issuance.  Excepting one case, this effect is found significant regardless of convertibility 
and whether or not each sub-sample is further split based on presence/absence of a 
conditional call protection clause.  In the case of convertible bonds with a conditional call 
clause, the profitability variable turns out insignificant.  This is potentially due to the fact 
that a call is possible only when stock value satisfies a certain condition under which 
profitability measure (PRO) and the stock value (VCONV) would be highly collinear. 
Fourth, freedom from conditional call protection clauses speeds up calling as 
should be the case.  Callable bonds of a longer life span tend to live a shorter percentage 
life.  These two effects are commonly found regardless of whether a callable bond is 
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convertible or not.  Calling a convertible bond is expedited as the conversion value 
increases, possibly due to conversion forcing call. 
Fifth, to compare the effect on calling of the interest rate spread across non-
convertible and convertible bonds and to see how this effect interacts with the transaction 
cost, we plot the estimated effects separately as a function of transaction cost.  Specifically, 
Figure 7 shows the estimated values of DINT/)|(log ∂∂ txth  against ln(Amount) 
separately for each sub-sample. 
As you see, the effect on calling of the interest rate spread is stronger for the non-
convertible bonds than for the convertible bonds.  For both types of bonds, this effect 
increases in ln(Amount) suggesting that the interest effect gets stronger as the unit 
refunding transaction cost drops. 
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<Figure 7> Estimated effect of DINT in each sub-sample 
 
 
The following table numerically summarizes the above graph by showing the 
estimated effects together with their standard errors as computed at three levels of the 
transaction cost for each sub-sample. 
 
<Table 8> Estimated effect of DINT in each sub-sample 
Non-convertible bonds Convertible bonds 
Transaction 
Cost ln(Amount) 
Estimated effect S.E. Estimated effect S.E. 
High 2.5 0.266 0.050 0.084 0.042 
Medium 4.0 0.353 0.057 0.214 0.036 
Low 5.5 0.441 0.103 0.344 0.036 
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Sixth, the baseline hazard function shows a monotonically decreasing pattern for 
the non-convertibles bonds, but not for the convertible bonds.  Tables 9-12 in the Appendix 
show that this monotonic pattern is in fact only significant for the non-convertible bonds 
without a conditional call protection clause, which is consistent with our prior expectation. 
 Lastly, in other model specifications not reported here (available upon request), we 
have included return volatility as an additional determinant of the call hazard rate.  We have 
tried two different measures.  One is the standard deviation of the stock rates of return 
using the most recent 12-month data, and the other using the most recent 24-month data.  
These volatility measures are time-varying in that they measure the volatility using the 
most recent data at each point in time.  Option theory predicts that the higher the rate of 
return volatility, the higher the value of the conversion option. Return volatility would give 
firms an incentive to exercise the call option early to preempt the conversion option of the 
bond holders.  In our estimation, none of the volatility measures turns out statistically 
significant, convertibles or non-convertibles. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions that the cost of 
financial distress expedites calling, of which the effect is only marginally significant for the 
convertible bonds but not significant for the callable non-convertible bonds; and that a 
callable non-convertible bond mitigates the agency cost of debt because firms that are 
highly in debt delay calling a callable non-convertible bond. 
This paper shows that a callable bond, convertible or not, is called to issue a new 
security if the market interest rate falls; that the interest effect becomes stronger as the 
transaction cost of refunding is low; that calling a callable convertible bond is significantly 
expedited by a rise in the conversion value, which suggests that firms often call callable 
convertible bonds to force a conversion; and that calling a callable bond, convertible or not, 
is significantly expedited if favorable information is released after issuance, which supports 
the view that callable bonds mitigate the problem of adverse selection under information 
asymmetry. 
Additionally, this paper shows that callable bonds of a longer life span tend to live 
a shorter percentage life; and that after the end of call protection periods the call intensity 
monotonically decreases for the non-convertible bonds but not for the convertible bonds. 
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The empirical results in this paper lend a support to the view that a convertible bond 
is partly an equity-like issue (Stein 1992) and partly a debt-like issue (Smith and Warner 
1979; Green 1984).  On one hand, callable convertible bonds are often called to force a 
conversion, suggesting that a callable convertible bond is an instrument of deferred equity 
financing.  On the other hand, callable convertible bonds are not a perfect equity-equivalent 
security.  Calling a callable convertible bond is also heavily affected by the refunding 
opportunity measured by the coupon rate minus the market interest rate, which is a property 
of debts. 
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Appendix: Measurement issues, descriptive statistics, and other results 
 
The measurement of time 
 
Let us explain the various time concepts, the time intervals, and normalized time 
to call by using an example.  Consider a convertible bond in Table 2 that was issued by 
Action Industries Inc. on April 1, 1983.  The absolute call protection period ended on April 
1, 1985.  The company called the bond on July 1, 1993 before it matures on April 1, 1998.  
There is no conditional call protection period.  Using the notation defined in the text, we 
have 01/04/19830 =t  (April 1, 1983), 01/04/198521 == tt , 01/07/1993=ct , and 
01/04/19983 =t .  The callable life span is computed as follows (using one year as the 
measurement unit):  
.13365/)11(12/)44()19851998(13 =−+−+−=− tt The time to call is 
25.8365/)11(12/)47()19851993(1 =−+−+−=− ttc .  Finally, the normalized time is 
computed as 6346.013/25.8)/()( 131 ==−−= ttttt c .  The callable bond is called at 
around 63% location of its callable life. 
For some observations, various calendar times are available up to a specific date; for others, 
they are only up to months or years.  In the latter case, we need approximations.  We adopt 
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mid-point approximation within an interval.  For example, when a date is known only up to 
a year, say 1999, then 1999/07/01 is assigned.  When a date is known up to a month, say 
May 1999, 1999/05/16 is assigned. 
 
Normalization and time varying explanatory variables 
 
At each moment in time, the decision to exercise a call or not is made based on 
whatever information is then available.  In our data set, some explanatory variables are 
measured annually and others monthly.  Suppose it is July 10, 1986.  To the corporate 
manager, yearly data is available for the years up to and including 1985 (up to the previous 
year) and monthly data is available for the months up to and including June 1986 (up to the 
previous month).  We assume that data for the current year is not available for the yearly 
data and similarly that data for the current month is not available for the monthly data. 
 In our data set, variables such as FASS, DEBT and PRO are recorded annually, 
and variables such as DINT and VCONV are recorded monthly.  These variables form time 
varying explanatory variables in our estimation.  For these time varying variables, we 
assume that the most recently available data affect the decision to call and thus appear in 
the call hazard rate function.  For example, in specifying the hazard rate for July 10, 1986, 
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year 1985 values are used for the yearly recorded explanatory variables, whereas June 1986 
values are used for the monthly recorded explanatory variables. 
Let us try to understand the way the time varying explanatory variables are 
rearranged according to the normalized time.  This understanding is very important for 
properly assigning a likelihood value to each individual observation.  Note that our hazard 
rate model uses the normalized time scale, whereas the data are recorded according to 
calendar time.  We have to reconcile this discrepancy.  Since our explanatory variables are 
recorded discretely, we assume that each explanatory variable only varies across different 
observation intervals and stays the same within each observation interval. 
For each callable bond, we observe a realized sample path of each explanatory 
variable from birth to death, where a death is defined as the earliest time point among call 
time, right-censoring time, and maturity time.  At a point in time between birth and death, 
the relevant explanatory variable value affecting a manager’s call decision is the most 
recent one.  For each time-varying explanatory variable, collection of the relevant values 
over the course of a call life will form a sample path.  Once a realization of an explanatory 
variable path is thus constructed, we map it on to the normalized time scale.  The resulting 
sample path in the unit time interval will be a step function covering the time horizon from 
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birth to the percentage death point.  The number of steps will be larger for the monthly 
recorded data and smaller for the yearly recorded data.   
Once the sample paths are constructed over the unit interval for the time varying 
explanatory variables, we can easily compute individual likelihood values.  This is because 
the integration appearing in the likelihood function (see subsection 4.4 of the text) reduces 
to summation due to the step function nature of the time varying explanatory variables as 
well as of the baseline hazard function. 
Note that we have already modeled the baseline hazard function as a step function 
with five steps partitioning the unit interval.  The partition points can be represented as a 
set: A={0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 1}.  Given a callable bond, the sample path of a monthly 
recorded explanatory variable will be a step function over the unit interval.  This step 
function will partition the unit interval.  Let us refer to the resulting set of partition points as 
B, which is common to all monthly data.  Similarly, let us refer to the set of partition points 
for the yearly recorded data as C.  Of course, C will be a subset of B.  Let D be the union of 
the above three sets, A, B, and C.   
Then, the hazard rate function )'exp()()|( 0 βtt xthxth =  itself will become a step 
function in the unit interval with steps shifting only at points in set D.  Using this hazard 
rate path, we can easily assign individual likelihood values.  Note that sets B and C (and 
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thus D) will be different depending on individual call structures.  Therefore, we have to 
assign individual likelihood values on an individual basis. 
 
Other descriptive statistics 
 
Figures 8 and 9 show the distribution of the normalized time to the end of the 
conditional call protection periods for those bonds with a conditional call protection clause 
for the sub-sample of non-convertible bonds and the sub-sample of convertible bonds.  The 
convertible bonds have shorter percentage life covered by a conditional call clause than the 
non-convertible bonds. 
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<Figure 8> Histogram showing normalized time to the end of the conditional call protection period: 
callable non-convertible bonds 
 
<Figure 9> Histogram showing normalized time to the end of the conditional call protection period: 
callable convertible bonds 
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To account for right-censoring, we compute Kaplan-Meier survival function 
estimates.  Figures 10 and 11 show the Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates for the 
sub-sample of non-convertible bonds and the sub-sample of convertible bonds.  From 
Figures 10 and 11, we observe that about two thirds of calls are made before 50% location 
of its callable life span for the callable non-convertible bonds, whereas about three fourths 
of calls are exercised before 50% location of its life span for the callable convertible bonds. 
 
<Figure 10> Survival function estimate for normalized time to call: callable non-convertible bonds 
 
 
 53
<Figure 11> Survival function estimate for normalized time to call: callable convertible bonds 
 
 
Figures 12 and 13 show the distribution of the normalized time to call for the sub-
sample of non-convertible bonds and the sub-sample of convertible bonds.  These 
histograms are constructed using the information contained in Figures 10 and 11.  They 
show the relative frequency of time to call for each decile of callable life span (10 bars 
in the middle), proportion of calls made exactly at absolute call ending point (thick line on 
the left), and the proportion of calls not exercised until maturity (thick line on the right).  
By comparing Figures 12 and 13, we observe that the time to call is more spread 
throughout its life for the non-convertible bonds than for the convertible bonds.  As you see, 
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11.7 % of calls are made right after the absolute call protection period ends whereas 19.7% 
of calls are left unexercised until maturity for callable non-convertible bonds. These figures 
are 2.4% and 13.9% for the callable convertible bonds. 
 
<Figure 12> Histogram showing normalized time to call: callable non-convertible bonds 
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<Figure 13> Histogram showing normalized time to call: callable convertible bonds 
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To see whether the normalized time to call differs systematically across callable 
bonds of different life spans, we draw scatterplots of the normalized time to call against the 
callable life span for the sub-sample of non-convertible bonds and the sub-sample of 
convertible bonds.  Figures 14 and 15 show these scatterplots.  We also include simple 
linear regression lines with correlation coefficients. 
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<Figure 14> Scatterplot showing normalized call time vs. callable life span: non-convertible bonds 
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<Figure 15> Scatterplot showing normalized time to call vs. callable life span: convertible bonds 
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These scatterplots show that a callable bond with a longer life span is called earlier 
in terms of percentage of life.  This is true for callable non-convertible bonds as well as for 
callable convertible bonds.  We naturally expect that the call hazard rate would be higher 
for a callable bond with a longer life span than for a similar bond with a shorter life span at 
each percentage point in callable life. 
 
Other estimation results 
 
Tables 9-12 show the call hazard function estimates for each of four sub-samples 
classified by convertibility and presence/absence of conditional call protection periods.  
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<Table 9> Call hazard function estimates: non-convertible bonds with conditional call clause 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-value p-value 
Constant -2.75 0.81 -3.37 0.00  
D[0,0.1] -0.56 0.65 -0.87 0.38  
D(0.1,0.2) 0.00 0.59 0.00 1.00  
D(0.2,0.3) -0.09 0.57 -0.16 0.88  
D(0.3,0.5) 0.28 0.46 0.62 0.54  
FASS -0.03 0.47 -0.07 0.94  
DEBT -2.08 0.60 -3.47 0.00  
PRO 4.92 1.64 3.00 0.00  
DFREE 0.48 0.37 1.30 0.19  
DINT 0.15 0.12 1.22 0.22  
DINT•Ln(Amount) 0.08 0.02 3.70 0.00  
Callable life span 14.33 4.00 3.58 0.00  
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<Table 10> Call hazard function estimates: nonconvertible bonds without conditional call clause 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-value p-value 
Constant -1.70 0.39 -4.30 0.00  
D[0,0.1] 2.18 0.25 8.65 0.00  
D(0.1,0.2) 0.57 0.31 1.82 0.07  
D(0.2,0.3) 0.86 0.31 2.79 0.01  
D(0.3,0.5) 0.81 0.29 2.83 0.00  
FASS 0.40 0.41 0.97 0.33  
DEBT -2.21 0.55 -4.05 0.00  
PRO 5.18 1.68 3.08 0.00  
DINT 0.07 0.07 0.99 0.32  
DINT•Ln(Amount) 0.05 0.01 4.32 0.00  
Callable life span -0.32 3.12 -0.10 0.92  
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<Table 11> Call hazard function estimates: convertible bonds with conditional call clause 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-value p-value 
Constant -4.13 1.09 -3.78 0.00  
D[0,0.1] 0.10 1.21 0.08 0.94  
D(0.1,0.2) 0.49 0.86 0.57 0.57  
D(0.2,0.3) -1.28 0.88 -1.45 0.15  
D(0.3,0.5) -0.36 0.64 -0.57 0.57  
FASS -0.29 0.80 -0.37 0.72  
DEBT 2.93 1.49 1.97 0.05  
PRO 0.78 3.67 0.21 0.83  
DFREE 0.92 0.78 1.18 0.24  
DINT -0.90 0.28 -3.24 0.00  
DINT•Ln(Amount) 0.27 0.08 3.65 0.00  
VCONV 2.60 0.29 8.92 0.00  
Callable life span -0.14 13.00 -0.01 0.99  
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<Table 12> Call hazard function estimates: convertible bonds without conditional call clause 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-value p-value 
Constant -3.89 1.67 -2.33 0.02  
D[0,0.1] 0.75 1.01 0.75 0.45  
D(0.1,0.2) 0.96 0.88 1.09 0.28  
D(0.2,0.3) 0.25 0.99 0.26 0.80  
D(0.3,0.5) -0.34 1.06 -0.32 0.75  
FASS 1.54 0.68 2.27 0.02  
DEBT 0.30 1.43 0.21 0.84  
PRO 7.03 2.57 2.73 0.01  
DINT 0.07 0.14 0.49 0.63  
DINT•Ln(Amount) 0.02 0.05 0.52 0.61  
VCONV 1.00 0.21 4.75 0.00  
Callable life span 23.80 14.53 1.64 0.10  
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